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ABSTRACT

Ataturk vs. Soleimani: Political Philosophy and Contemporary Archetypes
by
Rachel R. Tolhurst, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2021

Major Professor: Dr. Robert Ross
Department: Political Science

This project is a comparative case study of the lives of the late Iranian General, Qassem
Soleimani and former president of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The
study is intended to reveal multiple similarities between these two historic figures
through the scope of prominent political philosophy derived from the works of Plato and
Machiavelli. Not only will it be identified that both men were devoted to a lifestyle of
continuous study of military matters, a practice championed by Machiavelli’s
conceptualization of the perfect prince, but their characters served as exhibitions of
Plato’s "timocratic" man. However, near the end of their pre-political careers, only
Ataturk was able to ascend to a position of political authority while Soleimani suffered an
unprecedented assassination. The goal of this project is to demonstrate support for the
argument that Machiavelli’s prescriptions for constant militant vigilance promotes a
sense of paranoia that hinders the pursuit of peripheral ambitions within a militant career.
Thus, while Soleimani followed a primarily Machiavellian path to leadership, Ataturk, by
virtue of his use of Platonic principles at the outset of his military career, became the
better equipped man to enter the political world, martial as he was. By applying the
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paradigms established by fundamental frameworks of political philosophy to
contemporary figures of power, this study will not only demonstrate the manners in
which the theories of these very different philosophers can work in conjunction with one
another, but it will also provide an examination of how well the principles inspiring Plato
and Machiavelli’s ideas withstand the challenges associated with modern security threats.
This study will draw evidence from the works of Plato & Machiavelli to provide a
substantial theoretical background for this analysis and will also focus upon biographical
accounts of Soleimani and Ataturk to elucidate anecdotal evidence to substantiate the
major claims.
(64 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Ataturk vs. Soleimani: Political Philosophy and Contemporary Archetypes
Rachel R. Tolhurst

This thesis is an examination of the lives of Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk through the lens of the political philosophies of Plato and Niccolò
Machiavelli. Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were noted for their militant
lives and share certain qualities of character in their pre-political careers that provide a
unique opportunity for a direct comparison and the formulation of a normative claim
assessing their relative successes and/or failures despite their many similarities. Through
the course of this research the conclusion asserts that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was a more
capable man than Soleimani to ascend to a position of political power specifically due to
his prioritization of Platonic principles from an early age which guided his pre-political
career. Soleimani, on the other hand, pursued a militant path more consistent with the
values of a Machiavellian prince and was therefore faced with a greater degree of
difficulty in attempting to transition to political life. The theories of Plato and
Machiavelli each propose strategies for moving toward an ideal state of governance but
apply very different methods for achieving it. While Plato values the pursuit and
inclusion of reason and enlightenment for all leaders, Machiavelli assigns more
importance the object of power regardless of societal consciousness. Plato’s most realistic
model of a leader that is not the famed philosopher king, is the timocratic man, largely
militant but not a stranger to the pursuit of reason. Machiavelli’s model is a militant
expert with a mastery of cunning and possibly duplicitous management of personal
affairs. Ataturk more closely resembles the timocratic man than Soleimani in his early
dedication to the goal of broad societal education and altruistic notions of political
reform. Soleimani’s life was more characterized by militancy and the elements of conflict
and deception that arise in Machiavelli’s model of leadership. As a result, Ataturk was
more prepared to face the challenges of the political sphere and Soleimani was left
vulnerable and ill-equipped to tackle international disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
The assassination of General Qassem Soleimani in January of 2020 signified, for
Iran, the loss of not only a major defender of Iranian dominance and sovereignty, but a
man who symbolized the Shia values that underpinned the society’s broader collective
identity.1 Following the fatal United States drone strike that claimed Qassem Soleimani’s
life, the world at large recoiled in shock and began to prepare themselves for the long
years of conflict which would surely ensue due to this extrajudicial, targeted killing.2
Subsequent studies and remembrances of his life, however, have each taken note of the
extensive depths of Soleimani’s militant lifestyle and have even gone so far as to label his
methods as “Machiavellian” .3 Assigning distinct philosophical frameworks derived from
historic political thinkers instantly contextualizes political behavior within the bounds of
an established academic framework of interpretation. Such terminological depictions are
accompanied by the associated traits with which they were contrived and therefore
communicate a large breadth of information within the confines of a single word.
Therefore, in order to avoid the promulgation of reductive understandings of prominent
political theories, developing studies which clarify the inner workings of such concepts is
an imperative step in identifying why this terminology is still relevant and important to
this day. Modern studies of leadership are largely reflective of the standards of
contemporary societies, however the regular application of historic political theory in
examining leaders in the modern day demonstrates that these paradigms remain central in

1

Aslan, Reza. 2009. Beyond Fundamentalism: Confronting Religious Extremism in the Age of
Globalization. Random House Inc.
2
Osnos, Adam Entous and Evan. 2020. "Last Man Standing." New Yorker, February 10: 40-51.
3
Weiss, Michael. 2019. "Iran's Qasem Soleimani is the Mastermind Preparing Proxy Armies for War with
America." The Daily Beast.
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conceptualizing our ideas on differing leadership styles and categorically defining the
traits that are often present within these heavily theoretical frameworks.
This study directly explores the impacts of applying the leadership paradigms of
Machiavelli and Plato to the pre-political behaviors of Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, two major militant figures in Middle Eastern history whose comparative
legacies reveal stimulating insights on modern leadership. In formulating a normative
claim concerning the relative efficacy of Qassem Soleimani’s style of leadership as
compared to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s, this research identifies that after applying the
frameworks for effective leadership from the theories of Plato and Machiavelli, Ataturk
was the better equipped man to transition from a militant lifestyle to a politically based
career. Being a closer example of Platonic ideals than Soleimani, Ataturk, known for
consistently exhibiting state-minded ambition for the betterment of the Turkish nation,
was ultimately better prepared to engage with the challenging territory of political life.
Alternatively, Soleimani, a militant expert and a true testament to Machiavelli’s
transcendent student of warfare and opportunity, did not possess an equivalent interest in
broad reformation or educational and political efforts, and subsequently found the
transition into the political sphere a much more difficult path to tread. The major
conclusions of this research clarify the many distinctions between Machiavelli’s concept
of an ideal leadership figure and Plato’s, arguably, most realistic model of practical
headship, the timocratic man. In retroactively comparing the leadership initiatives of two
very similar subjects, this research uses Machiavelli and Plato’s philosophical
frameworks to assign meaning to these distinctions in a manner that produces significant
analysis with regards to contemporary political behavior. It is observed through this study
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that Ataturk’s early interest in political change and community-wide improvement are
indicative of several major Platonic principles championing state-minded selflessness and
reason-based thinking which directly aided him in reaching his ultimate goal of a political
career. Alternatively, Soleimani’s primarily Machiavellian career path, shrouded in a
constant state of warfare with little thought toward a political future, left him vulnerable
and somewhat unprepared for the volatility of the political realm. Thus, Machiavellian
efficiency with respect to militant vigilance, is perhaps best wielded in conjunction with
Platonic principles which propel the broad cultivation of society-wide progress in the
pursuit of higher reason.
Question
What characteristics are exemplified by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Qassem Soleimani
that are consistent with the standards of Plato’s prescriptions for effective leadership as
opposed to Machiavelli’s?
The process of applying fundamental political theories to the observable
behaviors of globally surveilled authority figures offers researchers the chance to test
these theories for their ongoing relevance and to draw conclusions based upon the
inferences that accompany the theoretical material. This project initially examines the
work of Plato and Machiavelli separately to identify the relevant attributes that are
present in the study subjects, Soleimani and Ataturk. The research discusses the theorists’
perspectives on the utility and definitions of both ambition and leadership. It posits that
Plato’s version of realistic leadership re-centers personal ambition to include state minded selflessness, while Machiavelli’s advocates for the internalization of ambition to
such a degree that it generates an overly defensive mindset, inhibiting the leader’s ability

4

to adapt to the realities of the fluctuating political world. Plato and Machiavelli’s theories
are then examined together, identifying that while both Soleimani and Ataturk satisfy
Machiavelli’s standards by way of constant military study, Ataturk more completely
fulfills the category of Plato’s timocratic man. Analyzing these concepts in tandem
reveals several possible explanations behind the very different demises of these
astonishingly similar men.
This study was conducted in full knowledge of several assumptions which could
have potentially influenced the resulting conclusions. Firstly, the death of Qassem
Soleimani came at the hands of a foreign adversary and was violent in nature while
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk died of natural causes long after his military career had come to
an end.4 This research assumes that Soleimani’s assassination, although admittedly
originating from an unprecedented5 and impulsive political decision, could signify some
degree of failure in terms of Soleimani’s pre-political career as compared to Ataturk.
However, this research will demonstrate that the argument positing that Ataturk had long
possessed a greater capability than did Soleimani to ascend to a political career,
originates from an in-depth analysis of political theory and considers the assassination to
be a side effect rather than the reason for Soleimani’s relative relegation for the purpose
of this study. Indeed, the focus of the biographical examinations is restricted to the prepolitical careers of each man to eliminate any bias based on the assassination event itself.
Isolating the pre-political experiences of Soleimani and Ataturk is an effective method for
drawing direct comparisons between the circumstances contributing to their character

4

Mango, Andrew. 1999. Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey. The Overlook Press.
Pg. 525.
5
Ibid. Osnos, A. E. Pg. 40-51.
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development as well as the nature of their extensive military occupations that preceded
substantial political engagement. Secondly, this research assumes that the burden of proof
which must be fulfilled to draw conclusions based upon the political theories of Plato and
Machiavelli, is a sufficient analysis of the referenced components such that the anecdotal
evidence is largely consistent with the nuances of the timocratic character and prescribed
continuance of military study. From this analysis this research provides normative
contentions in support of the argument that while both men were largely timocratic
archetypes and consistent students of war for the duration of their pre-political careers,
the differing utility and theoretical definitions of personal ambition appropriately serve as
sufficient grounds to determine the concluding suppositions of this research.
The following sections of this project paper will begin with a review of the
existing literature surrounding the subject of modern leadership analysis and describe the
ways in which this research project departs from the prevailing academic narrative.
Secondly, the paper will include a discussion of theory, offering explanations deciphering
specific theoretical elements that serve as comparative tools supporting the research
contentions. Subsequently, the paper includes a description of the case studies in the form
of a detailed biographical account of Qassem Soleimani followed by that of Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk with particular emphasis on each subject’s pre-political career. The next
section contains a discussion of the central normative contentions, utilizing theory and
examples from each case study to compose a structured argument and draw conclusions
about the research. Finally, the essay concludes with a summary of the findings and a
discussion of areas for potential future research.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Modern research concerning leadership deals largely with issues of interpersonal
communication and conflict resolution. Any setting within the confines of a hierarchical
system is bound to have its difficulties. However, contemporary research concerning
leadership styles and initiatives demonstrates the ways in which leaders are not only
expected to behave under specific pressures but further promotes the growth of
discussions surrounding the standards of contemporary societies and why emphasis on
examining leadership matters. The breadth of modern research relating to leadership not
only identifies the many ways in which average individuals are able to take initiative in a
leadership role but also establishes the importance of leadership as a fundamental
structure for establishing order and maintaining efficiency. The following sections
contain broader descriptions of such research as well as a discussion of the use of
political philosophy in evaluating leadership styles.
Existing research on the issue of leadership deals largely with communication and
human-oriented decision making. A study published in the Journal of Business and
Psychology in 2010 demonstrates how differing methods of communication between
leaders their subordinates produce varying results in production outcomes and lends
credence to arguments demonstrating that leaders possessing decisiveness and an aptitude
for supportive and precise language are more capable of eliciting a positive and efficient
work atmosphere.6 The study’s major implications are offered as reference material for
the purpose of future training exercises for leadership roles in various settings, indicating

6

Reinout De Vries, Angelique Bakker-Pieper, and Wyneke Oostenveld. 2010. "Leadership =
Communication? The Relations of Leaders' Communication Styles with Leadership Styles, Knowledge
Sharing and Leadership Outcomes." Journal of Business and Psychology 367-380.
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that modern studies on leadership initiatives regard leadership as something to aspire to
and continually improve upon rather than something that comes as a natural ability.
Another major area of focus is the subject of conflict management. An examination of
this dynamic conducted by Sameer Limbare in 2012 identifies that individual leader’s
methods of conflict management are often directly linked to their style of leadership.7
This directly impacts the relationships within authority structures and can reveal traceable
outcomes of specific conflict management behaviors. This study was intended to indicate
the most effective ways of dissolving internal disputes in a manner that improves the
major professional mechanism but also helps leadership figures to adapt their modes of
resolving disagreements to increase functionality and cohesiveness. While both of these
major themes in modern research of leadership allow for the application of common
principles of ideal leadership styles, the inclusion of political philosophy in support of the
quantitative methodologies of studies such as these would provide additional leverage for
researchers hoping to convey a meaningful precedent for the significance of leadership as
a subject of study. Political philosophy stemming from historic leadership structures that
still affect us today lends valuable insight to the inferences that are made with respect to
such hierarchies and the principles they represent.
There are also multiple perspectives regarding the utility of political philosophy in
the context of evaluating modern leadership initiatives. The value of Machiavellian
notions is predominantly referenced as advocating selfish deviousness in his prescriptions
for effective leadership under the burdens associated with unilateral authority.8 Although

7

Limbare, Sameer. 2012. "Leadership Styles & Conflict Management Styles of Executives." Indian
Journal of Industrial Relations 172-180.
8
Caron, J. 2019. The Prince 2.0: Applying Machiavellian Strategy to Contemporary Political Life.
Singapore: Springer Singapore.
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Machiavelli’s work is credited by some scholars for reconstructing the bases of
fundamental political thought at the time, others contend that Machiavelli’s goal in
writing The Prince was to apply these concepts within the context of observable history9
rather than to discredit political philosophies already in existence. Machiavelli’s theories
depart from the traditional structure of Roman civil science as a technique for political
study and instead utilize evidenced behavior of political figures to construct new
interpretations and postulate explanations based upon the primary foundations of a secure
civil society.10 Machiavelli’s work demonstrates the value of preserving a society in
which law and order can be rapidly restored and upheld, and advocates for closer
examination of political action as indicative components of human behavior.
Machiavelli’s arguments are largely empirical observations of recorded history and
calculated human choices.11 Concepts originating from moral tenets such as
Machiavellian virtue12 and ethics have been largely swathed in prima facie conversations
that restrict the scope of psychosomatic reactions to political challenges in a world of
ever-evolving social issues.
The broader discussion of Machiavelli’s major contributions contends that
Machiavelli is largely motivated by realism without regard for sentimentality in his hopes
for peace in Italy. However, some scholars have taken extra care to examine his
theoretical derivations and possible inspirations that deviate from popular assumptions.
One such perspective comes from the writing of Isaah Berlin who argued that

9

Viroli, Maurizio. 2004. Machiavelli. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ibid. Viroli. Pg. 117.
11
Ibid. Viroli. Pg. 123.
12
Molchanoy, Mikhail A. 2016. The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Leadership. United
Kingdom: Taylor & Francis.
10
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Machiavelli’s prince is not amoral after all, but rather an ode to the tenets of moral values
in ancient Greece as opposed to modern notions of morality.13 Thus, for Machiavelli’s
purposes, the wellbeing and glory of the state is placed in higher regard than matters of
individual virtue. This indicates that Machiavelli’s princes need not worry about their
personal salvation so long as their efforts toward the preservation of the state are in
earnest. Another famous account of Machiavelli’s motivations comes from Baruch
Spinoza14 who asserts that Machiavelli’s work was not meant as a directive manual but
rather as a warning intended to reveal to the citizens the ways in which leaders have and
can continue to take advantage of the society for their own personal gain. These
conclusions are drawn largely from the fact that Niccolò Machiavelli wrote The Prince
while in exile, and thus suggests that this work is intended to serve as a scathing critique
of how the state truly operated. Nevertheless, this project’s rendering of Machiavelli’s
philosophy subsidizes existing academia by demonstrating how the application of
philosophical principles in the face of contemporary security concerns may allow for the
evolution of these theories. Furthermore, such analysis may help to produce actionable
intelligence and useful forecasts concerning the political behaviors of other nondemocratic leaders.
Platonic exploration is conceivably the most prevalent when seeking observations
concerning exhibitions of wisdom and virtue amongst rulers in modern history. The key
narrative encompassing Plato’s contributions to these discussions is couched in his
depiction of the philosopher king whose mastery of inner equilibrium and wisdom make

13

Berlin, Isaah. 2013. "The Originality of Machiavelli." In Against the Current: Essays in the History of
Ideas, 33-100. Princeton University Press.
14
Steinberg, Justin. 2008. "Spinoza's Political Philosophy." In Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited
by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford University Press.
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him the ideal leader to bring about harmony and profound development in civil
societies.15 Plato’s representation of the republic illuminates the indispensable functions
of cohesive societal components such that justice is ultimately demarcated as a condition
in which both the society and the individual governing it has attained equilibrium
between instinctive, primal urges and the will to pursue reason and enlightenment16
primarily for the purpose of aiding the growth of a society unless its leader is a conduit
for the completely pure, untainted, and unabated knowledge of the good.17 Another
approach to research applying Plato’s leadership paradigms to modern leadership
dilemmas is by dissecting the epistemological roots of Plato’s major ideas. One study
published in 1998 examines the foundations of Plato’s ethical arguments identifying the
primacy of self-sufficiency and moral reasoning as central but not independently
sufficient attributes that assist a good leader.18 It concludes that a managerial viewpoint
on matters of organization and justice in tandem with charisma and transparency each
have something invaluable to contribute to evolving modes of leadership behavior with
respect to the ethical codes that define modern societies and restrict certain activities such
as reality distortion and tyranny.
Another major discussion dissecting the finer points of Plato’s dialectic is the
subject of the role of military figures in civil societies. The research of G. R. Lucas opens
a discussion surrounding the appropriate subject and functions of the guardians and
warriors in the ideal state, clarifying that “The role of the modern warrior is the neverending struggle against the abuse of power by tyrants and criminals and the protection of

15

Bloom, Allan. 1968. The Republic of Plato. Basic Books LLC.
Miller, David. 2017. "Justice". University of Stanford.
17
Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 221-250.
18
Takala, T. 1998. "Plato on Leadership." Journal of Business Ethics 785-798.
16
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the vulnerable rights and liberties of their prospective victims. Warriors, as distinct from
tyrants and criminals, use force reluctantly, and only when necessary, for this sole
purpose: to protect the well-being of others, and never simply to harm them”.19 His work
pulls from a discussion of higher moral callings in the pursuit of justice and proposes that
these principles are often overlooked in modern research. This research project departs
from such studies and draws analytical support from Plato’s predeterminations of the
timocratic20 man in tandem with the moral values associated with Platonic principles to
provide explanations for political actions and to further assess this framework in the
context of security challenges that had yet to exist at the time of this theory’s conception.
Furthermore, this research is similarly examined through the lens of Machiavelli’s
notions of militant responsibility and appropriate methods of societal engagement.
This project provides supplementary comprehension to current political research
on the applications of historic philosophy by presenting several consistencies in the
characteristics of non-democratic leaders that generate useful inferences and could
promote the development of forecasting matrixes for political actors in like
administrations. If it is observed in the case studies that the conditions described by Plato
in the creation of the timocratic man are applicable to the origins of either or both
Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, it will then be concluded that the
decisions made by each subject were likely partially inspired by the principles of Plato’s
timocratic theory. If it is observed that in conjunction with the elements of Plato’s
timocratic man, either or both subjects exhibit a pattern of regular engagement with

19

Lucas, G. R. n.d. "Forgetful Warriors": Neglected Lessons on Leadership from Plato's Republic.
Annapolis: Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership. U.S. Naval Academy. Pg. 14-18.
20
Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 226-227.
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Platonic concepts championing altruism, education, and state-minded reformative efforts,
it will be concluded that the subject in question is largely consistent with the values of
leadership most closely associated with Plato’s prescriptions for leadership.
Alternatively, if either or both subjects display a departure from these notions in pursuit
of personal achievement and duplicitous activities, the conclusion will reflect that the
behavior of the subject in question is more consistent with a Machiavellian model of
leadership. If one subject is found to reflect Platonic values and the other exemplifies
Machiavelli’s prescriptions, it will then be concluded that this distinction is a major
element in determining the overall effectiveness of the leadership styles that are described
in each case study.

13

THEORY
The philosophies of Plato and Machiavelli in describing the attributes of
competent and effective leaders each call for differing qualities of personal character with
the common goal of reaching an ideal state. Machiavelli’s depiction of the perfect prince
conjures imagery of a master tactician with an extraordinary sense of situational
awareness and an unmatched ability to wield the best and worst aspects of human nature
to manipulate his reality and secure his position of authority. Alternatively, Plato’s
philosopher king is a man swathed in the pure intention of the pursuit and dissemination
of truth in the face of the warped realities created by lesser ambitious men, tasked with
applying this knowledge to faithfully guide civilization toward an elevated level of
conscious equilibrium. While there are certain complementary elements from each
philosopher, it is imperative to clarify the fundamental distinctions which separate the
underlying connotations of these concepts. Firstly, Plato’s work includes a detailed
description in descending order of the regime types and leadership styles that follow the
decay of the ideal state beginning with the timocratic man, molded by the circumstances
of his upbringing. Although this Platonic figure is not the ideal philosopher king, he is
nevertheless still capable of accessing the components of his soul that are guided by
reason and can therefore act in accordance with several Platonic principles despite being
a largely militant figure by nature. Secondly, Machiavelli prescribes vigilant attention to
the continual study of military strategy for leaders hoping to take and maintain control in
their respective realms. This militant figure, however, departs from Plato’s timocratic
model by virtue of its being a broadly accessible directive toward dominant sovereignty
in full acceptance of duplicitous and manipulative practices. The following includes a

14

synopsis of the theory components which have been applied for the purpose of this
research.
Plato and the Timocratic Man
The biographical study of Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk reveals
striking similarities in the characteristics of each subject, namely their early subjection to
governmental blunders, ascension to power from humble origins, and distinct proclivity
for combative strategy. Plato’s depiction of the timocratic man illustrates the
circumstances in which astutely militant figures can develop and provides analysis
concerning the accompanying personal attributes that influences their behavior. Plato’s
character profile of the timocratic man portrays a martial epitome whom, despite the
contentiousness and natural ambition21 that accompanies his temperament, is an honor
and victory seeking22 man, a remnant of the “Laconian regime”.23 Though he aims to
serve a greater purpose, the timocratic man is “not single-minded towards virtue”24 and is
apt to indulge in his vices more so than the archetype of the philosopher king. For Plato,
Timocracy, termed as the government of honor, is a degradation of the ideal state in
which the inequities which are bound to arise in any growing population create internal
conflicts and forge characters of a different constitution than those in Plato’s ideal state
under the philosopher king.25 As for the society itself, many cultural aspects of the
previous governmental era would remain, however, “the fear of admitting philosophers to
power”26 would result in a departure from the peaceful, reason-governed logos that once

21

Jowett, Benjamin. 2021. The Republic. Monee, Illinois. Pg. 157.
Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 223.
23
Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 223.
24
Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 160.
25
Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 158.
26
Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 159.
22
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prevailed and instead lead to a convergence of passion-driven and warlike tendencies.27
The timocratic man that develops from such societal origins is likely to witness the
hardships of his father under the strain of ineffectual governance28, and observe the
frustrations of his family29 and servants in witnessing his father’s ostensible submission
to subjugation in the face of foolhardy governmental policies and ill treatment from his
fellow men.30 It is only when he grows older and steps out into the broader world that his
latent desire to escape the condition of being at another’s mercy comes to fruition.
The timocratic man observes that the ambitious and appetitive behaviors of some
produce more success and respect than the more subservient and rational principles
championed by his father.31 He therefore places great stock in behaviors which bring him
recognition and triumph and he embraces his personal aspirations often in pursuit of
militant excellence and sustained wealth.32 Plato describes this timocratic figure as
remarkably obedient to authority; “he is a lover of ruling and honor, not basing his claim
to rule on speaking or anything of the sort, but on warlike deeds and everything
connected with war”.33 The characters of timocratic men in Plato’s view, are largely the
result of having placed priority upon physical and combative accomplishments whilst
neglecting exercises in philosophical reason. “They weren’t educated by persuasion but
by force - the result of neglect of the true Muse accompanied by arguments and
philosophy while giving more distinguished honor to gymnastics than music”.34

27

Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 225.
Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 160.
29
Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 227.
30
Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 161.
31
Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 161.
32
Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 225.
33
Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 227.
34
Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 225.
28
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Nevertheless, the timocratic man, in Plato’s mind, is still able to ascend to the portion of
the soul that is midway between reason and desire, proving himself to be courageous if
perhaps somewhat aggressive in achieving his goals.35 “He doesn’t have a bad man’s
nature”36 and is not so far removed from Plato’s ideal as to be selfish and greedy like
those dwelling within an oligarchy.37 The timocratic man is a realistic portrayal of an
ambitious, physically inclined being whose aspirations surpass those of his predecessors
and whose actions are guided by this desire to rise.
Machiavelli and the Study of War
In researching the lives of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Qassem Soleimani, there
appears a shared ethical motto which guided their military careers and ensured their
ascendency as prominent martial experts: consistent dedication to the study of military
strategy. In the words of Norman Schwartzkopf, “the more you sweat in peace, the less
you bleed in war”.38 Machiavelli emphasizes that an essential element of protecting and
constructing a fearsome and respectable reputation as a leader is the continual study of
military subjects. “A prince who is ignorant of military matters […] cannot be esteemed
by his soldiers, nor have confidence in them. He ought, therefore, never to let his
thoughts stray from the exercise of war; and in peace he ought to practice it more than in
war, which he can do in two ways: both by action and by study”.39 Machiavellian
efficiency is largely measured through manifestations of militant success despite possible
violations of ethical boundaries. However, more than simply making constant
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demonstrations of military might, Machiavelli stressed that it is essential for leaders to
make a habit of the ceaseless study of history and warfare such that the lessons thereof
may assist him in forming pre-emptive battle strategies. He prescribes that even and
perhaps most especially during periods of peace, leaders must be contemplative of
potential threats and be actively developing tactics for defending his territory. “He must
[…] learn the nature of the land. […] This knowledge is useful in two ways. In the first
place, one learns to know one’s country, and can the better see how to defend it. Then by
means of the knowledge and experience gained in one locality, one can easily understand
any other that it may be necessary to venture on. […] From a knowledge of the country in
one province, one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others”.40
The centrality of martial expertise was central to Machiavelli as an article of
leadership. “A prince should have no other object, nor any other thought, not take
anything else as his art but that of war […], for that is the only art which is of concern to
one who commands. And it is of such virtue that not only does it maintain those who
have been born princes but many times it enables men of private fortune to rise to that
rank”.41 He cites the success of Francesco Sforza in becoming a duke due to possessing
adequate arms to do so and clarifies that the condition of being unarmed makes a man
contemptible and unlikely to inspire loyalty.42 Machiavelli also praises Philopoemen,
prince of the Achaeans for ceaselessly pondering modes of war, noting that this continued
cogitation prevented the occurrence of any situation which he could not overcome with
his soldiers.43 The constant pursuit of military knowledge must therefore be conducted
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through deeds and study. “Besides keeping his armies well-ordered and exercised, he
should always be out hunting, and through this accustom the body to hardships, and
meanwhile he should learn the nature of the sites. [In this fashion] one learns to know
one’s own country, and one can better understand its defense”.44 As for mental
engagement, Machiavelli insists upon intensive reflection of historic battles and the
emulation45 of great men whose wartime victories brought them long-term success.
Remaining in continual observance of history and actively engaging with the nuances of
battle strategy is, in Machiavelli’s view, a surefire method of making oneself prepared to
face the challenges of changing fortunes and external dangers.
The value of having access to two distinct martial profiles from Plato and
Machiavelli depicting an idealistic military figure is found in a broader discussion of the
motives behind their conception. The function of keeping Plato’s timocratic man separate
from Machiavelli’s conceptualization of a vigilant military expert is a matter of
distinguishing between one’s nature and the voluntary pursuit of power. The timocratic
man is a figure whose roots from a struggling, subjugated family simply instills in him
the desire to acquire general respect rather than an innate instinct for martial strategy.
This, in Plato’s view, usually results in the timocratic man’s pursuit of athletic
demonstrations of greatness such as military endeavors, but he is not violent by nature
and his skills come only as a result of his engagement with physical modes of routine.
Alternatively, Machiavelli’s recommendations for the ideal prince are composed as a
manual for success regardless of the nature of the man in power. His depiction of a
militant expert is simply a man who consciously engages with the strategies he outlines
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as a matter of prudent choice. Indeed, one of Machiavelli’s goals in writing the prince
was to demonstrate that nearly any figure of authority that was willing to commit to the
prescribed regimen of study and adapt his instincts would be able to succeed and defend
his sovereignty. Alternatively, Plato contends that a timocratic man could only arise from
a very precise set of circumstances rendering this character far more unique. This
distinction between the major theoretical tools being applied is essential in accurately
communicating the significance of these concepts in the context of the case study
subjects.

20

CASE STUDIES
The cases I have chosen to evaluate are the pre-political careers of Qassem Soleimani
and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk; two prominent military figures hailing from non-democratic
regimes in the Middle East, born into nations on the cusp of major political and social
change. The specific development of revolutionary societal movements as a direct
response to ineffectual governance in the early stages of both cases presents a similar
narrative to the events that were occurring during the historical eras in which Machiavelli
and Plato wrote their theories concerning leadership and authority. Machiavelli’s, The
Prince, was partly inspired by his desire to see a martial hero like Lorenzo de ’Medici46
rescue Italy from the hands of barbarous invaders that had long plagued its shores. Plato’s
Republic was written in a time when Athens was experiencing multiple violent and
abrupt governmental shifts that often cast the entire community into chaos.47
Furthermore, these biographies reflect the two major philosophical elements being
utilized in substantiation of the essay’s major claims, Plato’s classification of the
timocratic man and Machiavelli’s prescribed vigilance in pursuit of militant wisdom.
Both Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk exuded these qualities, but only one
was able to successfully apply them for the purpose of transitioning from a military
profession to a political career.
Though the concepts of the timocratic man and Machiavelli’s perfect prince are used
to identify the many similarities between both study subjects, these classifications
represent two very different leadership methods. While the timocratic man is still a model
of militant efficiency, he remains rooted to platonic concepts such as selflessness and
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transparency for the good of those he leads. Machiavellian princes, on the other hand,
embrace the use of duplicity and rely upon force rather than reason-based persuasion to
guide their constituencies. Through the course of this study, it can be observed that both
Soleimani and Ataturk were dedicated students of war and shared similar timocratic
characteristics arising from like circumstances. However, overall, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
more fully embodied the breadth of Platonic principles than Soleimani, whose path more
closely mirrors that of Machiavelli’s militant prince. This observation lends credence to
the idea that leaders who more readily embrace concepts consistent with Platonic wisdom
and ambition in their pre-political lives are better equipped to field the challenges
associated with political careers. Alternatively, leaders that assign higher value to matters
of warfare and conflict over matters of the mind and societal enlightenment have a higher
degree of difficulty when faced with the realities of the political world. The next section
is a summary profile of Iranian political development, followed by the biographical
account of the Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. This will precede a summary profile of
Turkish political development, and a subsequent biography of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Iranian Political Development
The history of the Iranian nation is largely characterized by its ancient Persian
roots; where “one of the world’s oldest nations, heir to a tradition that reaches back
thousands of years, to periods when great conquerors extended their rule across
continents, poets and artists created works of exquisite beauty, and one of the world’s
most extraordinary religious traditions took root and flowered. Even in modern times,
which have been marked by long periods of anarchy, repression, and suffering, Iranians
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are passionately inspired by their heritage”.48 Modern political development in Iran is
largely colored by the oil stalemate between 1951 and 1953 in which Iranian oil supplies
were nationalized by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in response to rampant
economic exploitation by its western partners.49 However, this decision ultimately
resulted in an economic and governmental crisis and the Prime Minister was forcibly
ousted from power at the behest of covert American action, and the Iranian Shah was
restored to power, an appointment which would precipitate the beginnings of the Iranian
Revolution.50 The era under Reza Shah Pahlavi is marked by oppression and widespread
corruption, and the Shah’s overtly western orientation left the people and the clergy with
the sense that secularism and western influences were distorting the sanctity of Iran’s
Islamic identity.51 This discontentment was further exacerbated by an economic system
which favored the middle classes but prevented further economic development and by the
Shah’s harsh authoritarian retaliation against public criticism and dissention.52 This angst
culminated in the 1979 Revolution in which the Shah fled Iran in defeat and the rule of
Iran was transferred to the hands of Ayatollah Khomeini whose primary goal was to
transform the Iranian nation to into a society governed by the central pillar of Shiite
Islam.53 The Iranian nation, though religiously reformed, has since faced no shortage of
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international conflicts; it was first challenged by the long Iran-Iraq War in the 1980’s and
has faced ceaseless conflicts since in the surrounding regions and internationally as its
engagement in proxy warfare and pursuit of nuclear weapons54 inspire global terror.
Qassem Soleimani
Qassem Soleimani’s life is largely characterized by his singular adeptness for
wielding his remarkable martial skills in exacting the will of the Iranian state with brutal
efficiency. His lifestyle was reminiscent of his urban roots from which he developed an
unparalleled knowledge of tribalistic conflict resolution and communication skills.
Soleimani was widely revered for his complete and unrestrained devotion to his role as a
wartime tactician and protector of Iran’s regional goals. For the Iranian people and the
Ayatollahs under which he so faithfully served, he represented the very purpose of the
1979 revolution. “Soleimani might not have been part of the urban social and intellectual
elites, but he was exactly who the revolution had championed: the ordinary
downtrodden”.55 He is remembered for possessing a fierce commitment to his position
and is characterized as a man devoid of fear, often desiring to be directly engaged in the
heart of combat amongst his fellow soldiers, truly a lion among men.56 These
extraordinary characteristics are at least somewhat derived from the conditions in which
Qassem Soleimani was raised in combination with his early fascination for the intricacies
of physical combat that carried over into his military career. Indeed, military study would
ultimately become the singular mode by which Soleimani lived his life, a true
manifestation of Machiavelli’s ideal expert in matters of combat.
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Likened to the timocratic man, so carefully described by Plato, Soleimani’s
ambition is largely a product of his desire to rise above the circumstances of his own
family, to surpass the accomplishments of his father such that he need not toil at the
hands of those with the power to make his life difficult. “Qassem grew up with a father
who had to live with debt and could not provide for his family the way he wanted”.57
Hailing from a miniscule rural community in Qanat Molk, and on the outskirts of any
influential Iranian circles, Soleimani was a member of the downtrodden who had suffered
the consequences of multiple detrimental land reform attempts by the incompetent Shah
during the White Revolution58 that took place in his youth.59 The Soleimani family was
not only deprived of the lands so intently promised to them by Reza Shah, but the
overwhelming debt they descended into due to this unfulfilled promise left them
shrouded in a veil of shame.60 Despite their financial difficulties, Qassem worked
construction-based jobs around the region in the summer months and he was able to
complete his high school degree which would grant him access to a wide range of
employment opportunities. By 1975, Qassem found an occupation which would take him
far from his home and on to the next transformative phase of his young life in the city of
Kerman.61
As Soleimani experienced the vibrant cultural expanse that urban life had to offer,
he stumbled upon the practice of martial arts which not only fascinated and enthralled
him but would play a crucial role in distinguishing him as a superb physical combatant in
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his early military career. “Kermani karate had found a most enthusiastic student and
Qassem had found a pursuit that gave his life meaning, perhaps more than any other thing
he had ever done”.62 Having worked for much of his life on construction sites that
required demanding manual labor, Soleimani spent a great deal of time at local gyms and
was the physical superior of many Kermani locals which only encouraged his interest in
leading a highly athletic life.63 Not only did this allow him to pursue his keen interest in
Iranian karate but he also bonded with boxers and other athletes that would eventually
become his close military companions such as Ali Akbar Pooriani64, his future deputy.
Timocratic in his obsession with physical demonstrations of power in exchange for
recognition and respect, this marked the beginning of Soleimani’s continual study of
militant strategy, as is required of Machiavelli’s perfect princes, and would ultimately
signify a major departure from Platonic ideals and a convergence with the latter.
However, the mid 1970’s in Iran would present an altogether new area of interest
for Soleimani as a wave of revolutionary clerics began to gain popularity amongst the
populace. As he wrestled with his role in this unfamiliar urban society, Soleimani began
attending mosque services, “Qassem wasn’t particularly religious but where else would
an ambitious young man who didn’t quite match with the Jack London-reading crowd
fit”.65 He was particularly struck by Seyyed Reza Kamyab’s criticism of the Shah’s white
revolution in 1977.66 “The rising economic difficulties of the country and an apparently
wobbling shah had given the revolutionary movement a new lease on life. […] Qassem
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Soleimani would later say: ‘My revolutionary struggles began when I heard a speech by
Martyr Kamyab’”.67 By the end of 1978, tensions between the Shah and his people were
at the point of no return after brutal crackdowns on clerical figures unleashed an
irreversible torrent of outrage and radical efforts. “Now was the time to make history, to
be part of something bigger than the tribe or the village, bigger than the world of karate
even. Qassem had not helped make the revolution, but the revolution was sure to help
make him”.68 Invigorated by the thrall of the changes to come and bolstered by a
confidence in his own physical prowess, Soleimani’s dedication to military matters
became all but a permanent fixture which would define the course of his life.
Eager to aid to revolution, Soleimani seized his opportunity upon the emergence
of the Iran-Iraq war. Following its genesis in 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) became the “most consequential militia in the history of the Middle
East”69 and immediately began recruiting volunteer Muslims. Although Soleimani was
initially rejected for the corps itself, he joined a local reserve corps connected to the
IRGC but was soon granted his wish when the revolution fell under threat of a foreign
enemy: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.70 The full Iraqi offensive began in September of 1980.
“By attacking and occupying Iranian territory, Saddam Hussein had triggered forces
beyond his imagination. The Iran-Iraq War became not the undoing of the Islamic
Republic but a cauldron of fire in which the nascent republic consolidated itself and
bolstered its rule. […] The fierce patriotism of Iranians had been awakened against a
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foreign invader”.71 In 1981 Soleimani was one of three hundred Kermani soldiers sent to
fight. His physical prowess, thanks to his martial arts background, was quickly detected
by senior figures and less than one month after Saddam Hussein’s forces attacked Iran in
1980, Soleimani was sent to coach physical education at the Quds Training Barracks72;
the term “Quds” here signifying Jerusalem and the existential goal of reclaiming this holy
ground from the Israelis. The training of physical ability as well as ideological attitudes
was a key component in the shaping of the IRGC73 and would in due course play a major
role in determining Soleimani’s fearsome reputation in the eyes of Israeli leadership and
ensuring the respect and loyalty of his men. “He was physically strong and had this sense
of determination that made him noticeable. […] He learnt how to say the right things
about Islam and the revolution, but his focus was on the military matters”.74
Soleimani’s physical prowess, commitment to the Quds force, and determination
to push back Iran’s enemies helped him surge forward in his career at a young age and
highlighted his ability to mobilize large groups of soldiers in the spirit of brotherhood and
unity for the purpose of serving a higher cause. “The young commander spoke of love
and God in his first real speech. The words of God asking for love and death were central
to Soleimani’s [addresses]”.75 His ability to appeal to religious tenets in conjunction with
heroic military attitudes was perhaps unparalleled and remained a key aspect of his
rhetoric through the entire course of his life. Soleimani, being a member of the fray from
his birth understood that one did not have to be an intellectual in Iran to speak the
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universal language of Islamism that could be understood by all Iranians in an instant.
This is the lightning rod which was utilized to rally warriors and encourage the sacrifice
of life and limb from Iranian soldiers that made Soleimani such a decisively effective
leader. His charisma and quiet sense of purpose gripped all those in his audience and his
efforts in this regard inspired strength and national pride throughout the entire nation for
the holy sacrifices that had been made for the sake of national security. “Thus, Soleimani
gave hope to the soldiers while also initiating them into the world of martyrdom”.76 The
idea that wartime goals were not simply for earthly gains but for elevating the reach of
Islam into the world is not a new notion in the middle east, but Soleimani’s use of the
concept of cosmic war77 was strikingly effective and bolstered his reputation in Iran as a
defender of the nation as well as the faith. However, Soleimani’s application of religious
tenets in motivating and directing his forces is reflective of a major Machiavellian
stratagem in which leadership figures were advised to take advantage of religion78 to
manipulate one’s followers and serve one’s own purposes. Though the invocation of
religious terminology hearkens back to historic cultural practices in Middle Eastern
warfare, Soleimani’s willingness to regularly wield this power to deadly effect indicates
and alignment with Machiavelli’s standards in complete opposition to Platonic principles.
After proving himself as a leader in the IRGC with the men in his charge being
the most disciplined and responsive to military commands, Soleimani was given
command over two battalions by the age of twenty five, jumpstarting his career and
catapulting him into the spotlight where he spoke words of encouragement and faith to
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thousands of soldiers at a time. In 1982 he accomplished successive battlefield victories
at crucial locations beginning in the besieged city of Shush, aiding in turning the tide in
Iran’s favor and prompting his commanding officers to grant Soleimani authority over his
own independent IRGC brigade which was composed of thousands of soldiers.79 Hassan
Bagheri, a gifted war tactician himself and Soleimani’s overseer, tasked Soleimani with
the liberation of a contested area in the Ilam province of Iran in what would be called
Operation Manifest Destiny80 which Soleimani would later come to call the “best
operation of his life”.81 With his battalion whittled down to roughly a hundred men,
Soleimani devised an ingenious ploy to trick the Iraqi forces and gain the advantage.
They assembled a massive collection of vehicles with no fighters in them and set them on
a path toward the Iraqis in the border village of Abu Gharib prompting the Iraqi forces to
flee from their strongholds and cede the position. Soleimani remembered the incident
with pride recounting that “despite the lack of weapons, we, the militants of Islam, had
been able to take 3,000 Iraqis prisoner”.82 His legacy grew with each conquest and so did
the impact of each triumph; “the Iraqis seemed to have little defense when faced with
human waves of armies with revolutionary zeal, not least because these armies were
fighting in the occupied territories of their own country”.83 Soleimani maintained a
fearsome reputation throughout the duration of the Iran-Iraq War, a truly masterful
tactician with a keen sense of military matters as a credit to his vigilant attention to the
study of strategy and its applications in battle.
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Soleimani’s devotedness to the cause of Ayatollah Khomeini was particularly
apparent through the late 1980’s84 when Iran was truly alone in battling its many
enemies. Upon having received no support from the UN or the US despite them each
having knowledge of Iraqi forces using chemical weapons on Iranian civilians and after
suffering the loss of Iran Air flight 655, the Ayatollah accepted a ceasefire in 1988 and
described this concession as having drank “a chalice of poison”.85 In the days after
Khomeini’s death, Iranian society had undergone yet another transformation in which the
role of the IRGC came into question. Soleimani returned to his home province of Kerman
where he reconnected with his roots in tribal culture with members of the IRGC to police
the areas that had been polluted with drug lords, bandits, and outlaws.86 It was through
this endeavor of regional pacification that Soleimani carved himself an enduring role in
repairing post-war Iran. Not only did he protect the nation from internal and external
threats, but he applied several of Machiavelli’s defensive concepts in using his prior
knowledge of tribal societies and local geography87 to negotiate regional peace with tribal
communities as well as improve these areas with the promotion of agriculture88, an effort
that did not go unnoticed by President Rafsanjani, with whom Soleimani would come to
forge a lasting bond. In 1992 Soleimani solidified his religious codification by taking the
holy pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina and in 1998, Hajj Qassem Soleimani was named
the commander of Ayatollah Khamenei’s Quds Force and would “turn the nondescript
force into the most ambitious expeditionary army in the history of the Middle East”.89
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Soleimani’s influence spread through the years90 to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza,
and Afghanistan, uniting an integrated transnational army under largely sectarian Shia
sensibilities and common purpose.91 He forged lasting connections with regional leaders
through his knowledge of historic cultural ties and avoided rash decisions based on
Quranic whims and instead became known for his calm use of strategic patience.92 By the
time Soleimani had entered what would become the final decade of his life, he had
established a legacy of protecting national interests whilst simultaneously advancing
Iranian pursuits across the Middle East despite considerable and nearly constant
opposition on multiple fronts. Having become the hub of anti-Zionist sentiments by
201193, the Iranian footprint came to be recognized globally for its brutal efficacy and its
leaders for their capability to preserve the narrative of protection for Islamists everywhere
from oppressive dictatorships. By 2013 global debate over the threatening status of Iran’s
nuclear program and its bitter feud with Israeli leadership took center stage in global
political discussion.94 Soleimani’s role over the following 7 years would encapsulate the
pinnacle of his power and craft for him a widely recognized reputation of greatness and
talent, an essential element of Machiavelli’s recommendations for princes to be held in
high esteem.95
The rise of ISIS in Syria created a unique opportunity for the Islamist regime to
expand its power and influence win the region. Soleimani’s Quds force dedicated itself to
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combatting advances from the Islamic State and Iran established several unlikely
coalitions not just with the United States and Iraqi militias, but also with Kurdish forces
who had an open alliance with Iran’s sworn nemesis; Israel.96 “Soleimani’s rushing to the
scene brought him praise at home and abroad. […] Many young people in Iran who
would have never gone anywhere near an IRGC figure now loved to share the heroic
images of his presence in the battleground”.97 However, this seemingly robust joint
venture was not to last as Iranian leaders rallied the Shia from Iran, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Iraq to defend one of the world’s most hated dictators: Bashar AlAssad.98 The Syrian conflict in conjunction with growing concern surrounding Iran’s
nuclear ambitions and ballistic missile capabilities ushered in the end of cooperation
between Iran and the United States. Despite the ratification of the JCPOA in 2015,
Iranian friction with American forces and regional99 enemies in the Middle East only
grew and by 2017, the Trump Administration and Soleimani himself traded political
blows via social media and through proxy conflicts within the territory.100 The Israeli
threat101, in tandem with President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign was unleashed
in 2019 and the Quds Force, under Soleimani’s command, continued its pursuit of
regional expansion and exerted defiant, aggressive responses to these assaults, namely the
asymmetrical warfare used to attack oil installations in Saudi Arabia.102

96

Ibid. Azizi. Pg. 234.
Ibid. Azizi. Pg. 234.
98
Ibid. Azizi. Pg. 239.
99
Soufan, Ali. 2018. "Qassem Soleimani and Iran's Unique Regional Strategy." CTC Sentinel 1-10.
100
Ibid. Azizi. Pg. 249.
101
Roshan, Parisa., Nader, Alireza., Kaye, Dalia Dassa. Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry. United
States: RAND Corporation, 2011.
102
Ibid. Azizi. Pg. 249.
97

33

Although the feud between Donald Trump and Qassem Soleimani escalated
throughout 2019 and was undoubtedly the inspiration behind the decision for the
general’s assassination, it was clear that Soleimani did not believe his work in Iran would
come to such an abrupt end. In his final months, the famed general took a more active
role in engaging in social media and addressing ongoing cultural issues such as defending
women who chose not to don a hijab and lending personal assistance in Khuzestan after
local authorities had failed to effectively respond to a flood in the area.103 He even
considered for the first time positioning himself for a future in government, going so far
as to have his men investigate the possibility of his candidacy for president in 2021.104
However, events spiraled out of control in December of 2019 as the US and Iran traded
strikes against one another105 in a variety of forms. Soleimani’s refusal to cease his
aggressive stratagems against the United States was repaid by January 3, 2020, with the
fateful drone strike that ended his life. Millions took to the streets across the Middle East,
some in misery and others in celebration, but one thing was certain; Soleimani’s
assassination came in an unprecedented fashion and this event would scar the Iranian
nation for years to come.
At the beginning of his life, Soleimani’s choices were somewhat consistent with
the characteristics of the timocratic man. Born under lesser circumstances and desiring to
surpass the accomplishments of his father, Soleimani sought out physical demonstrations
of greatness early on and gleaned respect from activities such as karate and wrestling
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before transitioning to a militant career. In his adult life, he encouraged the cultivation of
agriculture to the remote tribal regions he became familiar with in his youth, promoting a
community-minded improvement for the better of the nation. In his final months, he took
more of an open interest in political issues and began to engage in broader discussions of
cultural change. However, the majority of Soleimani’s life was ultimately defined more
by Machiavellian concepts than Platonic. A student of warfare from the moment he took
an interest in karate, his military career occupied the lion’s share of his life and within it
he displayed a willingness to manipulate and alter the fabric of his reality to accomplish
his wartime objectives. Soleimani’s intricate knowledge of regional geography aided him
in not only defending Iranian territory but also in planning offensives in neighboring
regions to wage proxy warfare. His life was consumed by combat on all fronts and
though his mind turned toward politics in his final days, his assassination leaves nothing
but unanswered questions regarding what form his political career might have taken.
Turkish Political Development
The modern Turkish state is marred by violence and political unrest under the
leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan106 whose reform of Turkish society signifies a
significant departure from the secular principles that had been established by Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk.107 However, despite this current political reversion, Turkey’s Ottoman
and Byzantine108 roots still underpin the broader societal norms of Turkish society to this
day. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire is a centuries-long era of conflict and
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exploration; threatened by Mongol invaders in the early 1200’s, warring with Iran in the
1500’s, Italy in the 1600’s, Russia and Austria in the 1700’s, and so on, experiencing
constant shifts in political culture in the face of the declining global influence and
domestic efficacy of its Sultans.109 Efforts to reform the failing Ottoman Empire and
adapt to increasing levels of international business culminated in 1845110 as Tanzimat was
initiated. Tanzimat was a major indicator of growing societal acceptance of several
western values111 in adherence with modern concepts of economy and trade, however, not
all elements of modernization were cohesive with the laws and preferences of the
Ottoman Sultans, thus the empire continued its slope of economic decline and stagnant
societal progress until the final days of the languishing empire. The Ottoman Empire and
its growing collection of inadequacies in dealing with wealth disparities and social issues,
grew oppressive in its surveillance112 of the populace, and corrupt in its legal structure.
Not only did the Sultan Abdulhamit II attempt to suffocate intellectual material
discussing freedom and independent activity, but he employed the use of brutal policing
to punish all those accused of undermining autocratic rule.113 These behaviors gave birth
to the beginnings of revolution and the ultimate demise of the Ottoman Empire. With
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk at the helm at the close of the first world war, the following era
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would come to be recounted as one of the most prosperous in Turkish history114, and
Ataturk’s reforms lifted the Turkish nation from the ashes of the Ottoman collapse.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
The impact of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s devotedness to the reformation of the
Turkish state remains a key element of modern Turkish identity. In 1923115, Ataturk
founded the Republic of Turkey, and his presidency is marked as a period of major
societal reform and modernization that launched Turkey into a new era of prosperity.
During his time as the leader of the Turkish republic, Ataturk re-designed the political
and legal system, revitalized the economy116, secularized both government and education
in abolishing the caliphate, granted equal rights to women, altered the alphabet as well as
traditional attire requirements, and finally, advanced the cultivation of wisdom from the
arts, sciences, industry, and agriculture.117 Ataturk had long believed himself to be the
savior118 of the Turkish state and he was determined from an exceedingly young age to
see this conviction come to fruition. These fundamental alterations to Turkish civilization
helped to create a thriving, forward-thinking society in the generations to come that
signified a significant departure from the failings of the Ottoman Empire that preceded it.
He passed away in 1938 after only 15 years of ruling, but it is still remarked that though
he was born an Ottoman, he died a Turk. However, his rise to political power was
supported by his extensive military career and impressive contributions on Turkey’s
behalf during the first world war. His battlefield successes coupled with a keen knack for
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military strategy launched Ataturk onto a path of militant legacy, and his early fascination
with political and social issues guided his career toward meaningful political engagement.
Indeed, though Ataturk’s pre-political career was largely militant, his motivations were
underpinned by a constant desire to forge opportunities for the intellectual growth and
liberation of Turkish society. A timocratic figure from the outset, Ataturk exhibited a
superlative sense of Platonic, state-minded ambition and would go on to reshape the
Ottoman Empire with this principle in mind.
The Ottoman Empire that preceded the new Turkish republic was known as the
sick man of Europe; a decaying society in which the disparity between the rich and poor
only grew119 as the Islamic theology that directed the finer points of Ottoman identity
simultaneously stunted Turkey’s ability to embrace modern advancements. Ataturk was
born into a police state controlled autocratically by the Sultan and Caliph following an
unsuccessful attempt at establishing a constitutional democracy in the late 1800’s. He
grew up observing corruption and despotism and despised the public regression that
tyrannical headship and archaic religious principles had created. His father, Ali Riza, was
certainly no stranger to the difficulties of attempting business ventures in the fragmented
chaos under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamit II.120 Indeed, he died at the early age of 47
after continually failing to succeed in his commercial schemes, branded a failure in the
eyes of his grief-stricken family that had already been afflicted with the loss of several
children.121 Ataturk, a young boy at the time pursued an education in the civil service
through the military academy of Salonica122, a major Turkish port city known widely for
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its multiethnic structure and diversity. “Military education reinforced in him an already
masterful disposition. As the only surviving male in a fatherless household Ataturk was
the most important person at home”123 and was further determined to avoid the failures of
his late father. This attitude of somewhat inherent superiority only grew as he excelled in
his prep school studies and quickly developed skills in writing124 and making public
addresses. This dexterity was also evident in his singular command of religious rhetoric,
instilled in him through years of religious instruction and practice.125 In his transition to
the War College in Istanbul in 1899126, his interest in literature and the works of banned
philosophers127 became a major aspect of his political foundations. He engaged with the
works of Rousseau and Voltaire in an effort to better understand the issues facing the
Ottoman society and found the arguments unsatisfactory. Although he was determined to
eventually find better solutions to the nation’s plight than those posited by modern
political philosophers, his primary focus was on his military career.128 Ataturk’s path
toward leadership exhibited incredible command of strategic military tactics129, a study
which was continually pursued throughout his lifetime. Ataturk’s vast collection of
impressive battlefield victories served as the major conduit through which he was
ultimately able to ascend to a position of political power. However, his engagement with
political philosophy in his early education birthed within him a steadfast determination to
apply his intellect and mastery of strategy toward the betterment of the Turkish nation
and the enlightenment of its constituents.
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In observance of the corruption and incompetent handling of the Ottoman military
at the hand of the Shah, “Mustafa Kemal combined political agitation with concentration
of his military studies. He was fashioning himself into a politically aware and politically
ambitious professional soldier”.130 Ataturk entered the war college in 1899131 in Istanbul,
the heart of the Ottoman Empire. There he witnessed Turkish citizens being forced to live
like prisoners, lowly in the eyes of rich despots and foreigners that sought to take
advantage of the frail societal structure. Social mobility was extremely limited, and
people often betrayed or even preyed upon one another to gain a lucrative position.
Conditions at the Imperial War College were similarly depraved due to a lack of
infrastructural foundations and a restricting network of the Sultan’s spies and edicts.132
Ataturk soon made friends who had high-ranking fathers, allowing him access to useful
connections which helped propel him into the political sphere later in his life.133 These
friendships provided him with opportunities to foster a greater appreciation of
independent activity and a loathing for the dictatorial chokehold of the Sultan’s policies
and military restrictions.134 “Mustafa Kemal believed that Abdulhamit’s fear of military
maneuvers and his refusal to allow the use of live ammunition in training exercises had
left the Ottoman armed forces unprepared for modern war. When the ban on the use of
live ammunition was lifted during Mustafa Kemal’s service in Syria, he is said to have
compiled a firing manual from such Turkish language sources as he could find”.135 In

130

Ibid. Mango. Pg. 49.
Ibid. Mango. Pg. 44.
132
Ibid. Mango. Pg. 44.
133
Ibid. Mango. Pg. 72-75.
134
Uyar, Mesut, Edward J. Erickson. 2009. A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Ataturk:
From Osman to Ataturk. California: ABC-CLIO, LLC.
135
Ibid. Mango. Pg. 85.
131

40

fact, he regularly engaged in legally prohibited activities such as drinking in public136
whilst being a soldier and secretly publishing multiple political papers137 detailing the
issues within the Ottoman Empire and openly criticizing the Shah’s governance. His
publishing activities resulted in his arrest138 at the age of 24 and he was exiled to
Damascus for three years where he was able to observe firsthand the damages created by
despotism and corruption139 in an environment of extreme militancy. Ataturk’s
dissatisfaction with the existing political order undoubtedly encouraged much of his
defiant behavior, but his attempts to broach the subject of political reform in the hopes
that his work might benefit and enlighten the broader society is an example of the
Platonic principles that inspired him throughout his pre-political life.
Ataturk’s political thinking remained central to his engagement with his military
career. He sought to foster a more comprehensive sense of the effective uses of military
strength and inspire an ethos revolving around politically radical concepts at the time.
“Mustafa Kemal was passionately interested in the art of war […] and he believed that
the safety of the fatherland and the happiness of the nation require[d] above all that the
world should be shown that [the Ottoman army was] still the same army that had planted
its lance in the walls of Vienna”.140 He decided to form a secret society prioritizing
freedom and idealizing the concept of the militant strength to be found in the fatherland,
but in 1908 another secret society that had been formed rose to the forefront and his own
committee became peripheral. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)141 pressured
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the Sultan to restore the former constitution142 of Turkey which had been dismissed some
30 years prior. However, despite the reformative efforts of what would become the
Young Turk Revolution, many of the problems facing the nation remained. Ataturk, still
concentrating on military matters and the collection of intelligence143, insisted that
measures should be taken to create a more defensible structure for the empire. “Mustafa
Kemal was suspicious of the Bulgarians. […] Mustafa Kemal warned that the Bulgarians
still hoped to regain Edirne. He argued that the Ottomans should respond by giving their
officers better training, and by instilling in them a spirit of initiative and the desire to take
the offensive”.144 His ideas were originally criticized heavily by other members of the
committee resulting in Ataturk’s separation from the CUP.145 Whilst governmental
control reverted to a dictatorial oligarchy for a time, his moment to shine arrived at last
with the onset of the first world war.
Having received a thorough militant education in the Ottoman Military College,
Ataturk’s keen use of martial strategy aided him in liberating two provinces in Turkey
and doling out a historically devastating defeat to British forces at the battle of Gallipoli
in 1915146 which facilitated his emergence from WWI as the sole Ottoman Commander
to have never suffered a defeat on the battlefield.147 Superiors recalled that, “Mustafa
Kemal […] was a commander willing to take on duties and responsibilities. On 25 April
he used his own initiative to join the battle with his 19th division and push the enemy
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back to the beaches. Then for three months he put up and indomitable resistance against
constant violent attacks. I was thus able to place total trust in his energy and
determination”.148 Ataturk’s experience in the territories of the Balkan Wars granted him
a unique perspective149 concerning at which locations the Allied forces were most likely
to make advances in the peninsula and he used this geographical expertise to take an
active role in formulating defensive strategies and attempting to prevent major losses
throughout the duration of the war. His mettle as a military commander was tested again
four years later as he successfully led his forces against an invasion from the Greek army
and subsequently won back Turkish independence150 in 1919 which defied the existing
Sultan’s government and established the basis for the new national effort under Ataturk’s
leadership. A proven military expert and a master in matters of diplomacy151, by the end
of the war Ataturk had been given command of eleven separate divisions as well as a
cavalry brigade.152 Ataturk’s militant skills were undoubtedly the result of his extensive
and continual study of military matters and his tactical use of geographic opportunities
throughout the region is an ode to a Machiavelli’s prioritization of the mastery of battle
strategy. To this end, although his actions were primarily derived from state-minded
political aspirations, Ataturk demonstrates the ways in which even the timocratic man can
channel Machiavelli’s principles of expert militancy.
Ataturk is one of the most revered military tacticians in Turkish history. He had
led several major offensives in-person153 with his soldiers by his side and is remembered
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as “the outstanding front-line commander in the northern sector. […] Mustafa Kemal was
not alone the savior of Istanbul, but he made a notable contribution to the defense of the
capital. He displayed personal courage and inspired his men who were fighting in
appalling conditions. Although his ambition [made] him a difficult man to work with,
[…] his ability was never in doubt”.154 Following the cessation of the great war in 1918,
Ataturk’s attention was devoted to the preservation of the few Turkish assets that were
still in the hands of the Turkish nation: the populace, the land, and a military force
capable of defending them.155 This was the driving motivation that he carried into his
transition to political life. Ataturk had proven time and again his nationalistic dedication
to defending the Turkish nation, but he made a concerted effort to establish the
importance of the tactful employment of armed forces in order to regain a sense of
national pride and to effectively defend the changes promised in a revolutionized society.
His goals came to fruition in 1920 as he was elected to the Presidency of the Grand
National Assembly and the days of the old Ottoman Empire came to a long-awaited
end.156 By 1922 the armistice after a long war had been signed and by 1923 the Lausanne
Treaty157 was ratified by several European powers. Turkey entered a new age of growth
and prosperity and with Kemal’s unanimous election to the presidency of the newly
proclaimed republic, the nation evolved to such a degree that Ataturk retains his title, “the
Father of the Turks”, to this day.
Ataturk came into the world under the strain of ineffectual governance and the
subsequent suffering of his family. Desiring to supersede the accomplishments of his
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father, Ataturk’s timocratic nature prevailed in encouraging his embrace of military
education. His early fascination with the works of political philosophers coupled with his
dissatisfaction of the governance in the Ottoman Empire inspired Ataturk to not only
develop a strong political foundation, but to wield it in the service of the Turkish
constituency. Militant though his pre-political career was, Ataturk’s major goals of a
cultural overhaul underpinned every decision that he made in achieving military
greatness. Although Machiavelli’s militant prince bears some similarities to Plato’s
martial timocratic leader, the key distinction elevating Ataturk’s relative success is the
consistency with which he displayed state-minded ambition in the hopes of promoting
widespread enlightenment and cultural liberation. From his publishing activities to his
suggestions for military reform, Ataturk’s hopes for the nation promoted the long-term
salvation of the historically oppressed Turkish state. His engagement with Platonic
notions represents a compounding of state-minded, reason guided thinking that begets
realistic manifestations of Platonic leadership.
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DISCUSSION
Upon analyzing the biographies of Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, it becomes palpable that both men were largely personifications of the timocratic
man and resolute students of warfare for the length of their pre-political vocations.
However, in developing divergent ethos with regards to their personal ambitions,
Ataturk’s early and consistent engagement with political issues left him better equipped
to broach the political sphere than Soleimani. Indeed, Soleimani’s inexperience in
engaging in global political discussion due to his prioritization of militant matters above
all else left him vulnerable and unprepared for a future in politics. The philosophies of
political theorists like Plato and Machiavelli help to generate the paradigms by which
political actions can be evaluated and explained. The examination of Qassem Soleimani
and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as a comparative case study lends itself to the basic
foundational elements of political theory that promotes the elevation of existing research
in the field.
This assessment has exposed multiple distinct parallels between the lifestyles and
behaviors of these historic figures whilst simultaneously bridging theoretical components
from two very different theorists. In addressing the research question concerning the
relative efficacy of Ataturk as opposed to Soleimani regarding their methods of
Machiavellian and Platonic activities, it is my contention that Ataturk was a more
effective leader than Soleimani in his pre-political career directly due to his prioritization
of long-term, state-minded reform. Although the pre-political careers of both Ataturk and
Soleimani were similar in origin, militant distinction, and charismatic styles of authority,
they differ with respect to their approaches toward the political sphere. While
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Soleimani’s priority for much of his life was simply maintaining a high-profile military
career, Ataturk used the Ottoman Army from the beginning as a conduit for his goals of
ascending to political office and reshaping the Turkish nation for the better and was thus
a more complete fulfillment of Platonic leadership concepts. Consequently, Soleimani’s
leadership style is more consistent with the tenets of Machiavelli’s prescriptions for
leadership. Furthermore, in applying the nuances of the theories of Plato and Machiavelli
as frameworks for evaluating political conduct, the inherent definitional discrepancies of
the concept of ambition generates opposing behavioral directives. While Plato’s version
of headship re-orients individual ambition to incorporate state-minded altruism,
Machiavelli’s advocates for the internalization of ambition to such an extent that it
engenders an excessively defensive mentality, impeding the leader’s capacity to
acclimate to the complexities of the shifting political world.
As for the more specific theoretical components, one of Plato’s overt desires in
writing The Republic was to promote an environment more conducive to the pursuit of
knowledge and the cultivation of reason as a central governing agent in civil societies.
However, even partial exhibitions of Platonic principles through the pursuit of stateminded reform have the potential to ease the process through which military figures
ascend to positions of political influence and achieve success in their pre-political
careers. Both Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk grew up during times of
major political and governmental instability and therefore possess several qualities
reflective of Plato’s timocratic man. While Soleimani witnessed the hardships of his
father due to the ineffective land reforms of the Iranian Shah, Ataturk observed gross
inequality in wealth distribution as well as highly restrictive religious codes that hindered
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the Turkish nation as well as his own father. Both men developed a keen interest in
martial strategy, recognizing that military figures were widely revered as both heroic and
honorable. Soleimani became heavily involved in Iranian martial arts and Mustafa Kemal
pursued a thorough education in multiple military academies before both formally began
their military careers. For Soleimani and Ataturk, military career paths served as
opportunities to not only garner respect in otherwise restrictive societies but also
provided a chance for them to play a part in the ongoing societal changes that were
occurring. Soleimani wished to become involved in the new Iranian culture that was
forming after the 1979 revolution and applied his natural skills with such success that he
quickly rose through the ranks of the Iranian military and would ultimately train one of
the most highly effective military outfits in the Middle East. Ataturk, being highly
dissatisfied with existing philosophy on effective governance, sought to one day affect
meaningful changes of his own and used his extraordinary strategic skill to prove his
worth in the first world war and continue defending the Turkish state against its enemies
with fierce efficiency for years to come. Both men reveled in their military successes and
took pride in the respect of their fellow countrymen. Neither would have achieved such
success had they not applied their natural senses of ambition and their desires to live a
more prosperous life that that of their fathers.
However, while Plato’s model of the timocratic man bears several characteristics
that are reminiscent of his concept of the philosopher king, it remains a far cry from
Plato’s preferences for ideal leadership. The timocratic model is described as a product of
the decline of the ideal state and is not as highly engaged in philosophy and yet he is not
so utterly detached from the ideal philosopher model that he cannot engage with certain
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elements of reason and altruism.158 Plato’s ideal manner of leadership prizes forms of
ambition that take the shape of selfless, state-minded improvement and further
encourages the dissemination of truth wherever possible. To this end Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk is a more cohesive fit with Plato’s description of the timocratic man than Qassem
Soleimani. Soleimani’s life is more consistently aligned with Machiavellian concepts and
the behaviors associated with Machiavelli’s princes are categorically classified as an
inferior style of leadership to that of the timocratic man. Hence, although the timocratic
model is not the ideal in Plato’s eyes, it would still maintain a higher status than a
Machiavellian prince. While Soleimani’s militant career was certainly derived to some
extent from his timocratic roots, his engagement in his adult life with religious
manipulation and deceit in his world of everlasting warfare makes him more
appropriately suited to Machiavelli’s ideals than Plato’s. The militant timocratic figure
that Plato describes is perhaps not the perfectly balanced philosophe that he so admires,
but it does provide a practical template from which analytical conclusions about militant
figures in history can be made in conjunction with other philosophers specializing in
militant efficiency. While Ataturk’s military career illuminated his skills in martial
strategy and his dedication to the study of warfare, his political motivations for the
purpose of elevating the collective consciousness of the Turkish nation more
appropriately characterize him as a timocratic figure, exuding Platonic ideals.
Finally, the details provided in the biographies of Soleimani and Ataturk, are sure
indications that both figures undoubtedly excelled in the realm of military study which
was so essential in the eyes of Machiavelli. However, to his peril, Qassem Soleimani was
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a more complete embodiment of Machiavelli’s leadership principles than Ataturk in a
variety of ways. One of this philosopher’s primary intentions in publishing The Prince
was to ensure that leaders maintained a high level of domestic control such that a prince’s
reign would never be threatened by the potential of revolution.159 As such, internal
stability combined with rigid military excellence was meant to defend the realm from any
outside threats no matter the number of international rivalries.160 However, there exists
within Machiavelli’s studious soldier framework an inherent mechanism for maintaining
a constantly proactive, defensive mindset. While this principle is undoubtedly a major
contributor to battlefield success and the maintenance of the territories one is charged
with defending, the vigilant sense of awareness and suspicion that Machiavelli requests
creates a sense of obsession that has the potential to overrule peripheral ambitions. The
psychological demand placed on Machiavelli’s ideal prince figure to maintain a relentless
state of primed consciousness concerning potential threats could be a major contributor to
the divide between military and political careers. Soleimani’s prevalence as a prominent
leader was directly intertwined with his ability to defend the Iranian nation and its
soldiers to such an extent that this mission dominated his life’s ambitions and contributed
to his arrogant and abrasive approach to political discourse. Nevertheless, Soleimani
suffered an abrupt death as a direct result of his heavily militant attitudes when faced
with political engagement, leaving chaos in his wake.161
Although both Soleimani and Ataturk each proved their commitment to the
cultivation of military knowledge beyond a shadow of a doubt, Machiavelli’s strategic
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principles as a whole entail more than a simple engagement with military matters. They
advocate for social manipulation where necessary and promote the use of personal
ambition to achieve individual power more so than to provide society-wide
enlightenment. While Ataturk exhibited martial skill and ceaseless military study,
Soleimani’s entire life was defined by his military career and his brutal, Machiavellian
leadership style. Soleimani was willing to apply some of the more duplicitous
recommendations of Machiavelli’s prescriptions through his frequent manipulation of
religious rhetoric as well as in his careful crafting of his international and domestic
reputation. He sought above all to be respected and loved by his soldiers and gravely
feared by his enemies and subsequently went to great lengths to accomplish this.
However, Machiavellian as he may have been, Soleimani’s final months were
characterized by his abject failure to engage in peaceful international discourse with
foreign powers as he turned his eye toward politics. This shortcoming has been argued by
some to be a result of his overwhelming hubris stemming from his extensive battlefield
experience and routine dealings in the realm of conflict itself.162 Indeed, it is widely
claimed that Soleimani “allowed his ego to overcome his judgment”.163 Defensive and
bold, Soleimani increasingly spoke in a threatening fashion and his “progressively
boastful rhetoric”164 in his dealings with President Trump demonstrated a fundamental
lack of diplomatic tact that would come to play a major role in his ultimate demise.
However, it is my contention that this failure is indicative of Soleimani’s broader lack of
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engagement with Platonic principles, and his obsessive Machiavellian approach to
addressing conflict on and off the battlefield.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Qassem Soleimani both exhibited, at least partially,
qualities valued by both Plato and Machiavelli in their conceptions of ideal leadership,
but the value of assessing the degree to which these men fulfill each philosopher’s
standards is indispensable in elucidating the significance of these concepts as they apply
to modern evaluations of leadership. This research addresses what it truly means for an
action to be classified as Machiavellian and demonstrates examples of how this behavior
manifests amongst modern leaders such as Qassem Soleimani. Although Ataturk was
similarly militant in his pre-political career, his actions even on the battlefield were
constantly guided by his deep-seated aspirations to rise to a position of political influence
and alter the displeasing conditions which he observed within the Ottoman empire. The
examination of the distinction between the militant prince and the timocratic man
identifies the key elements distinguishing leaders like Mustafa Kemal Ataturk from other
prominent martial leaders in history. Ataturk’s early-prioritization of state-minded
motivation, an attribute that even Plato finds essential in a leader, is very likely to have
majorly eased his journey toward a career in politics. To this end, it can be argued that
pure, unfiltered exhibitions of Machiavelli’s leadership principles cannot secure longterm invincibility to international threats against one’s sovereignty. Indeed, such
behaviors, if not tempered with certain Platonic concepts to enhance societal progress can
result in the loss of one’s authority altogether.
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CONCLUSION
Upon reflection of the information gathered throughout the course of this study, it
can be conceivably argued that a key determinant in the differing fates of Qassem
Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was the theoretical ethos by which each man lived
his life. While Ataturk was guided by principles of a more altruistic, Platonic nature,
Soleimani’s inherent Machiavellian mentality drove his career toward a less desirable
end. In the context of existing applications of political theory in the interpretation of
political actions, this study provides a comparative analysis that not only engages with
the nuances of the detailed characteristics described by Plato and Machiavelli but goes a
step further in connecting these profiles to explain psychologically based behaviors that
are derived from these frameworks. Plato’s conceptualization of the timocratic man
presents realistic and observable traits that can be applied to both Soleimani and Ataturk
as militant figures whose origins served as inspiration to surpass the accomplishments of
their fathers before them. The total entrenchment of Soleimani and Ataturk in devoted
and ceaseless study of military strategy both in their careers as well as their lifestyles is a
clear ode to Machiavelli’s recommendations. While Qassem Soleimani maintained
singularly militant aspirations in his pre-political career, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
possessed long-term political goals that underpinned every aspect of his military career,
demonstrating the continued value of Platonic principles in observed political behavior.
Thus, while Soleimani’s accomplishments in combat secured him a place in history, the
inherency of Machiavelli’s defensive stratagems and the hubris that often accompanies a
militant lifestyle drove him toward dangerous conflicts on the international stage and
hindered his attempts to ascend to a position of political power.
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Future research relating to this subject could examine several areas of inquiry left
unanswered through the course of this study. In drawing comparisons between the
Turkish and Iranian societies at these points in history, both reveal themselves to be
revolutionary societies with repressive elements. However, as Turkey was a secular
community and Iran, theocratic, it must be asked whether cross examinations of political
behaviors stemming from such dissimilar civilizations broadens or limits the capacity for
political theories to be effective metrics for examination. Furthermore, given the
fluctuations in political and cultural standards in both nations in the modern day, there
exists an opportunity to evaluate not only the scale of the improvements men like Ataturk
have contributed to their societies, but also the relative effectiveness or lack thereof if
these alterations fade over time. For instance, does the current reversion of secular values
in modern Turkey indicate a sense of failure by Ataturk himself or simply represent the
natural evolution of cultural norms in the face of a changing political world?
Furthermore, Ataturk’s leadership behaviors, though found in this study to be more
consistent with Platonic values, also reveal certain departures from Plato’s ideal standards
in the inherent flaws associated with the timocratic man. Having been raised under
economic strain due to the failures of his father, the timocratic man is noted to be stingy
with money165 and acquire his wealth with a certain degree of secrecy. Given the
knowledge that in Ataturk’s later political career he was known to conceal his wealth166,
this might indicate a difficulty in claiming that most of his political aspirations were
based in Platonic altruism and selfless motivation. Further research might inquire whether
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Ataturk’s late political ambitions stayed true to his originally altruistic ambitions or if
these goals were distorted by the lure of wealth that he had been deprived of in his youth.
Another area of inquiry lies in a discussion of the circumstances of Qassem
Soleimani’s death. The unprecedented nature of the targeted killing was undoubtedly a
shock to the international community, but inquiries could be made concerning whether
Soleimani’s mercurial behavior in response to American aggressions truly triggered dire
concerns warranting his assassination, or whether he was simply the victim of a historic
political blunder. It might also be a useful examination of the relationships depicted in
Machiavelli’s writing concerning rulers and those who serve them. Soleimani was used
for the purpose of this research to examine own leadership behaviors, however, as a close
personal agent of Ayatollah Khomeini, Soleimani was regularly deployed to exact brutal
and violent retaliation upon the enemies of the Ayatollah and the state. This hearkens
back to the example of Machiavelli’s archetype, Cesare Borgia and his exploitative
relationship with Messer Remiro d’ Orco167, prompting questions as to whether or not
this relationship would be a more effective example in which to showcase Machiavellian
principles regarding the protection and management of one’s own reputation. Regardless,
the lives of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Qassem Soleimani are exceedingly thoughtprovoking examples of the many ways that militant figures can change the world and
contribute to modern political research in expanding the application of political
philosophy to contemporary archetypes.
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